Moral and Epistemic Relativism

[Emmy]

Hiya,

So, instead of flagrantly derailing any more existing threads, I thought I'd start a new one. About relativism, concerning both what is right and what is true.

I'm curious about whether you think that what is morally right or what is true are relative either to cultural context or to individual perspective. Please feel free to treat either topic alone or to discuss both- whatever interests you.

My short answer is No. There are a lot of footnotes and disclaimers, but basically the answer, I think, is no. (Just as a personal aside, I find that this puts me in opposition, often, to those with whom I'm usually most closely politically aligned- that is, the left. )

I'll come back a bit later (after I finish yet another overdue assignment- ugh, what is wrong with me???), I think, and elaborate, but I thought I'd throw this out there now and just see if anyone was interested in the topic.

Thank you!

Emily

[Thinker]

I would definitely be interested.....if I knew exactly what you're asking.

Will you put it in simpleton-ese for me, please???

[Emmy]

Ha, well, I'm certainly not buying the 'simpleton' claim!

But let's see if I can express myself a little more clearly... I guess I'm asking whether people think that acts are right or wrong in and of themselves (or claims true or false in and of themselves), on the one hand, or whether what is right and what is true vary according to context. Do morality and/or truth mean anything independently of what individuals or societies deem to be right or true?

Hope that helps a bit. Please let me know, though, if not!

Thanks very much,

E

[EnderD_503]

I disagree, what is morally "right" or "true" is entirely relative. Morality is a man-made construct and as such was moulded to whatever belief system it spawned from and, therefore, can only be "true" according to said belief system, but is by no means ultimately true (meaning it cannot exist without that system). Some morals are subjective according to culture or individual, however, others are more pan-human due to the very reason that they concern the survival of the species (a pan-human concern). Therefore, it stems more from the desire to survive (and the desire for those closest to ourselves to survive), a desire which exists in every other species.

I often find it strange the way people in marginalised communities cling to morality as though without it discrimination of marginalised groups would run rampant. I've actually found the case to be quite the opposite. Morality seems to have, at least partially, spawned discrimination in that it passes judgement (or worse) upon any act its own system deems as wrong. That act may be murder, or, on the other hand, it may be sex between two people of the same sex, or sex between two people of a different race, and so on and so forth. Oddly enough both sides, both the "bigots" and the "enlightened" seem to prefer to tout the other as undoubtedly immoral and their own perspective as undoubtedly moral. Why not use reason over moral codes? Who's morality is more moral and according to whom? An extremist who blows up a building or anything else is just as full of moral conviction as those who point at him as the epitome of immorality, the devil in disguise. What makes popular western or left-wing convictions more "true" than any other? Location? The mere fact that one happens to agree?

[little man]

i think that truth, right, wrong, moral, immoral are totally subjective. if not, how could there be mitigating or extenuating circumstances?

i've long thought that the 'truth' is only what you're willing to believe.

i do make a distinction between true and truth. true would be an observable fact. truth would be more aligned with faith. for me. i don't believe in any universal truths. what works for one or some does not always work for others.

i think that groups of people who agree to live together (societies) make tacit agreements on what is acceptable behaiors and laws are made accordingly. those who are unwilling or unable to abide by those laws used to be banished. now, they're imprisoned.

i'll stop here, before i wander into one of my long time thought processes on social contracts.

[Isadora]

Morality, to me, is a form of religious or spiritual belief in right for the betterment of those who believe the same and/or to achieve (heaven, nirvana, Avalon, etc.) a higher being after death. Morality is based on fear of eternal punishment. (Margaret Mead)

Ethics is about how we form guidelines in our society for the betterment of all people. Ethics guide how society works and is lubricated. As societies grew (according to anthropologists and cultural geographers) ethical behavior changed based on the needs of a particular society. Ethics, to me, is about how society agrees to live with each other. Ethics can include many forms of belief especially around decision making, laws, conflict management and how we perceive truth.

And then there is truth. It is an old word...actually of German/Saxon origins. The etymology of the word is from the German "troth" to be faithful or true. It meant to be "treu" is to be faithful, honest, loyal and to live in good faith. The word for "factuality" is actually "soth" (k, this is as close as I could get on this computer to the spelling). There are two distinct meanings for what is truth. I believe soth is always coloured by our perception and therefore subjective. Truth as in being faithful is an emotional or ideological connection to a person, community or society.

(K, I have a fetish about words, meaning and cultural awareness of language.)

So this is a long winded explanation of what littleman said. LOL

[Licious]

Great thread, my egghead side is happy, happy, happy. :D

[Emmy]

Thank you for your thoughtful response. You make several good and interesting points.

On one reading, it seems to me that your first paragraph assumes what it seeks to demonstrate. The logic here seems similar to this: Morality does not exist except relative to human cultures. Therefore, morality is relative. If the aim here is to show that an act can be right or wrong only insofar as people judge it to be, I don't think the case has been made.

However, if the crucial point you make in your first paragraph is instead that particular moral codes, developed and upheld by particular cultures, must be remembered to be cultural products -and not, a priori, correct in their moral judgments - I'm with you entirely.

In your second paragraph you make several great points. One of which is that conventional codes of morality have often been used to oppress marginalized groups. What I take from this, though, is that not nothing is right and nothing is wrong, but rather that the codes used to brutalize those who are different simply have it wrong when it comes to evaluating morality; that these codes are wrong about right and wrong.

I would also like to point out that, implicit in your argument, I contend, is the notion that discrimination against target groups is a bad thing. (And yes, I certainly agree :)) But what underlies that assumption if not a moral judgment? Isn't it the case that the tragic consequences you so rightly point out from the imposition of particular codes of conventional morality are to be avoided precisely because they are wrong?

I whole-heartedly agree with your last assertion, the point that we cannot assume that any particular agreed-upon moral code -e.g., conventional western morality, if there can be said to be such a thing - is correct. I think that that's the great insight behind relativism and I very much agree: We must not assume that familiar moral codes are correct. However, I don't think it follows from this that acts cannot be right or wrong. Rather, what I take from the idea is that we all have a responsibility to examine societal moral codes -especially those of our own society- with the utmost scrutiny.


Thanks again for the engagement. Very much appreciate it!

Emily
I disagree, what is morally "right" or "true" is entirely relative. Morality is a man-made construct and as such was moulded to whatever belief system it spawned from and, therefore, can only be "true" according to said belief system, but is by no means ultimately true (meaning it cannot exist without that system). Some morals are subjective according to culture or individual, however, others are more pan-human due to the very reason that they concern the survival of the species (a pan-human concern). Therefore, it stems more from the desire to survive (and the desire for those closest to ourselves to survive), a desire which exists in every other species.

I often find it strange the way people in marginalised communities cling to morality as though without it discrimination of marginalised groups would run rampant. I've actually found the case to be quite the opposite. Morality seems to have, at least partially, spawned discrimination in that it passes judgement (or worse) upon any act its own system deems as wrong. That act may be murder, or, on the other hand, it may be sex between two people of the same sex, or sex between two people of a different race, and so on and so forth. Oddly enough both sides, both the "bigots" and the "enlightened" seem to prefer to tout the other as undoubtedly immoral and their own perspective as undoubtedly moral. Why not use reason over moral codes? Who's morality is more moral and according to whom? An extremist who blows up a building or anything else is just as full of moral conviction as those who point at him as the epitome of immorality, the devil in disguise. What makes popular western or left-wing convictions more "true" than any other? Location? The mere fact that one happens to agree?

[adorable]

I really like this thread.

As I am reading and getting all scholastic (it's been a while) - I keep getting stuck on two things:

1. female castration
2. arranged marriage

I would like to say that I believe that cultural norms make things acceptable that are not acceptable within the confines of my society. But that just isn't true.

I am questioning whether it's more about how those in that society perceive the reality of their situations that changes how I feel about things or do I see it as absolute in it's wrongness and want to "save" people based on what I morally feel is right? Does one have to come first for me to be outraged?

For instance, I watch the tribal shows on the Travel Channel. Fascinating. As I'm watching that show I am not judging them. They do things and believe things to be true based on their society norms. I watch the show and the people in the tribes all seem to be happy with the way their life is....I don't sense that anyone there has a problem with their customs or rituals.

This is not true when I see things about female castration in Asia and Africa. I get outraged, and yet it is a social custom that tribes have practiced for years. I would never have known about the practice if someone hadn't spoken out against it. Would I be outraged if the women who are forced to go through it weren't outraged? If they went under the knife (or piece of glass or dirty can top ugh) willingly or happily even? There is no way to know since I wouldn't have known unless the victims spoke out in horror.

Arranged marriages happen on the tribal shows on the travel channel. Everyone seems happy enough. Some of the guys have multiple wives. I don't judge it. Yet, when I read about Subia Gaur who is 18 (& others like her) and fled for her life from an arranged marriage, I am outraged. So it can't be that I'm outraged about arranged marriages in general, I am outraged for those that are outraged...

lol I hope this makes some sort of sense, but the whole thing is sooo interesting. "Humans have a moral sense. They think they know right from wrong and therefore are able to do right from wrong." - Mark Twain.

[Massive]

I'm very interested in this topic, but I need to come back to post for real after I've had more sleep and been able to formalize my thoughts to the point where they make more sense.
Thank you for starting this thread Emmy!

[atomiczombie]

Finally, something I feel comfortable speaking to. There are a few threads going here on the planet that are so heated that I do not feel like throwing my hat in the ring would add anything constructive, but on this topic I have something to say.

I look at ethics and morality and the comparison of the two in terms of how the language is used. Context is always the key to meaning. The word "moral" can have different meanings depending on the way it is used and who is using it. The basic context of the use of the word moral is the evaluation of the principles of human action. Sometimes it is specifically used in a religious contexts, but sometimes it is used independently of religion. In the religious context, a deity or religious path (God, or Goddess, or buddhist principles, for example) is brought into the discussion. However, it is a kind of discourse that can be used by atheists as well, and even say, a Christian and an atheist can discuss what is right and wrong and be talking about the same thing.

To say that these two contexts of the use of the word "moral" are mutually exclusive and only one is correct is to fall into the fallacy of reductionism. Reductionism can be defined as the attempt to reduce all explanation and interpretation of experience into one conceptual or theoretical framework. It asserts its own point of view as superior to others. It selects certain aspects of experience from which to draw its conclusions while downplaying the importance of (or in some cases even ignoring) other aspects which do not as easily fit into its theoretical system. I believe that the context in which a term is used has a significant bearing on its meaning.

The word "ethics" is more often associated with the academic study of morality and moral principles. However, the two can sometimes be used interchangeably. To say something is moral, one can also say it is ethical. The nature of language is that it is sometimes, and even often times, not rigidly used in a consistent meaning, but loosely and fluidly related. So one can say that while the word "moral" and the word "ethics" or "ethical" do not always have the exact same meaning, they both have family resemblances. (See Ludwig Wittegenstein's Philosophical Investigations for my source.)

As for the subject of moral relativism, my perspective is that the context of an action is the key to determining whether an action is moral or not. However, this is not the same as relativism as it is often used, including how some have used it in this thread. For the purposes of this discussion, I will assign a particular meaning to the word "moral" which I find to be a common thread in its various uses: to be moral is to actively seek the good, happiness and well-being of others as much as I do my own. I include the concept of "as much as" here because I believe that fairness is a moral concept that is intertwined with the meaning of "moral".

And now to the meat of my argument! Although I believe that context is key in dertermining whether an action is moral, I do not believe that morality is relative in its nature. Here is an example to consider: A woman drives down a narrow street in a residential neighbor hood. A small child darts out into the street from behind a parked truck just as the woman in her car approaches said parked truck. There is not enough time for the woman to stop the car and avoid hitting, and ultimately killing the child. Consider scenario #1: as soon as she sees the child, the woman slams on her brakes in an attempt to stop her car, but to no avail and the child is struck dead. Scenario #2, the woman sees the child run out into the street in front of her but makes no attempt to stop her car and avoid hitting the child. In both scenarios, the result is the same. The child is dead. But is there a moral difference between the two scenarios? I say yes. The woman in scenario one demonstrated by her actions that she regarded the well being of the child by attempting to avoid the accident. In scenario two, the woman showed no regard for the child's well being by making no attempt to avoid harming the child. The woman in scenario one was more moral than the woman in scenario two. The intent of the woman in this example is the key to determining whether the action is moral, and not strictly the outcome.

I believe that there are actions in this world that are absolutely wrong in particular circumstances (taking into account the intent). And some actions are morally wrong in any context. Torture and rape come to mind here. Some may disagree with me, but my standard for morality is the regard for the well being of others. Determining what is the best action one can take to reach that goal can be very complicated. Many people can have a stake in different outcomes. War comes to mind when I think about this.

A moral relativist can say that kicking puppies isn't strictly right or wrong, but only in the context of the culture one is raised in. So some people enjoy kicking puppies and if that is a tradition in their culture, then it is not wrong. I say, kicking puppies is morally wrong, period. It shows no regard for the well being of the puppies. I am not a moral relativist.

You can agree or disagree with me. The concept of morality has more than one meaning depending on its context, and more than one standard by which actions are measured. I am only using one particular standard by which to make moral judgements. I realize that the word "judgement" is a loaded word, so I want to clarify that I am using it in terms of whether a particular action is moral, and not whether a person is moral.

I have done a lot of thinking about this over the years, and in my studies as a philosopher in college. I am open to criticism as long as it is respectful, and interested in this dialogue. :)

[betenoire]

I'm gonna dumb it down even further.

Now, we all agree that using a ladder to climb onto someone's balcony, steal their cat, and bring their cat home to live with you sounds like the wrong thing to do....right?

Just say that the owner of said cat had a long history of going out of town for weeks at a time and leaving the cat behind, that she had been gone for over a month this time, that the cat could be heard crying and was clawing under the door whenever someone walked down the hall, and the smell of urine and feces coming from the apartment was so bad that it could be smelled in the adjoining apartments. And to add to that several people from the apartment building had called the SPCA and all they did was leave notices on that person's apartment door demanding that she call them? THEN is it wrong to use a ladder to climb onto someone's balcony, steal their cat, and bring her home to live with you? Of course not.

Not that I've done that or anything. (The cat is fine, by the way. Although a little neurotic and clingy, and often breaks into the garbage can for food even though I feed her MORE than what she needs and she is now quite fat. I mean, um. What cat?)

But seriously, of course things like "right and wrong" are totally dependent upon circumstances. Stealing a necklace because you want it is bad, stealing a loaf of bread because your kid is hungry is not bad. Hitting someone over the head with a frying pan because you're annoyed is bad, hitting someone over the head with a frying pan because they are harming you is not bad.

[Emmy]

Great posts. Thank you for your contributions.

I love the distinction that those who have posted are drawing between two different ways in which context might be said to matter when we evaluate the morality of an act.

1. First, acts which share a name -stealing a cat, or hitting a child with a car, to use others' examples- should be evaluated very differently depending upon surrounding factors of both intent (illustrated in the child example) and outcome (illustrated in the cat example.) I totally agree! Sometimes, this is what people mean when they say that morality is context-dependent. (I think I might frame it a little differently, and say that these acts, in themselves, are inherently different across these conditions. But that is just a matter of framing, I think...)

2. At other times, when people say that morality is context-dependent, they mean something entirely different; they mean that an act (even when all the particulars of intents and outcomes have been well-specified) has no moral value in itself. Rather, things are right and wrong only insofar as people judge them to be so. It is this sense of context-dependent morality, and not the first, with which I disagree.

Best,

Emily

[atomiczombie]

I disagree, what is morally "right" or "true" is entirely relative. Morality is a man-made construct and as such was moulded to whatever belief system it spawned from and, therefore, can only be "true" according to said belief system, but is by no means ultimately true (meaning it cannot exist without that system). Some morals are subjective according to culture or individual, however, others are more pan-human due to the very reason that they concern the survival of the species (a pan-human concern). Therefore, it stems more from the desire to survive (and the desire for those closest to ourselves to survive), a desire which exists in every other species.

I often find it strange the way people in marginalised communities cling to morality as though without it discrimination of marginalised groups would run rampant. I've actually found the case to be quite the opposite. Morality seems to have, at least partially, spawned discrimination in that it passes judgement (or worse) upon any act its own system deems as wrong. That act may be murder, or, on the other hand, it may be sex between two people of the same sex, or sex between two people of a different race, and so on and so forth. Oddly enough both sides, both the "bigots" and the "enlightened" seem to prefer to tout the other as undoubtedly immoral and their own perspective as undoubtedly moral. Why not use reason over moral codes? Who's morality is more moral and according to whom? An extremist who blows up a building or anything else is just as full of moral conviction as those who point at him as the epitome of immorality, the devil in disguise. What makes popular western or left-wing convictions more "true" than any other? Location? The mere fact that one happens to agree?

I find it interesting that you say this. I am wondering if you mean the same thing as I mean when I talk about reductionism. If so, then might that evaluation be a judgement too? What I am getting at is that making evaluations about whether or not something is say, "discrimination" or not, is implying that discrimination is wrong, or at the very least that some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness. At least that is what I hear you saying, and if I am wrong then please correct me.

I believe that objective reason and moral discourse are different sorts of the use of the Language. As I said in my previous post, "judgment" is a loaded word. What I mean here is that for some people it can have a negative connotation. For example, to pass judgment on someone is to evaluate them harshly and by a narrow set of criteria which are unfair. That sort of thing. But the word Judgement has another meaning too - the act of making considered decisions or coming to sensible conclusions ("considered" here meaning to weigh all available facts first). And yet there is something lacking in this definition too, I think. Having all the available facts does not lead to one inevitable conclusion which reason alone can determine. There has to be another element involved to get from facts to a decision. I would call this element human will, or human freedom. Another way of describing this is to say that the bridging of the gap between facts and conclusions requires a qualitative leap of human will (See Soren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments for my source).

It is my contention that reason alone cannot speak to moral questions of right and wrong. Moral discourse, while talking about facts, is not really about the facts but about what it means to be a human being. And further, that even the most extreme moral relativist cannot escape this human element, this qualitative leap. To say that there is no true morality, only objective facts is to make such a leap. The facts themselves cannot do this, only a human with a free will can. This is what Kierkegaard means when he says that Truth is subjectivity (see Soren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript for my source.).

I would be happy and very interested to hear what you think Ender, and what the rest of you think as well. :)

[apretty]

i like context.

[Venus007]

I need to post this to get the ball rolling or I will never post (I am somewhat shy of posting things of substance and I have to just do it)

At a very basic primitive level I think that acts are right or wrong in and of themselves. Not all acts, of course. I believe that for us as a species the acts that are “right” are the ones that preserve our survival both as an individual and as a species. As well as acts that preserve our individual autonomy (meaning that if I think it is right to enslave people because it will help me be a more viable human creature (viable meaning more likely to produce more successful offspring to adulthood and subsequent breeding) that is wrong because it takes another’s autonomy.)
Outside of this very simple idea of right and wrong everything else is a cultural/societal imposition.

My ideals of right and wrong are not based in a belief of a “higher standard” outside myself either by an idea of a deity or of some natural law written on our hearts. My idea of right and wrong hinge on autonomy and species preservation.

Somewhere mixed in here is also an idea that individuals who cannot choose for themselves, children, individuals who are mentally incompetent, delirious, unconscious etc have the right to be protected by society until they are able to make autonomous choices or in the event that they cannot make autonomous choices to be given as much leeway as possible stopping short of the destruction of another or self harm.

[dreadgeek]

Hiya,

So, instead of flagrantly derailing any more existing threads, I thought I'd start a new one. About relativism, concerning both what is right and what is true.

I'm curious about whether you think that what is morally right or what is true are relative either to cultural context or to individual perspective. Please feel free to treat either topic alone or to discuss both- whatever interests you.

My short answer is No. There are a lot of footnotes and disclaimers, but basically the answer, I think, is no. (Just as a personal aside, I find that this puts me in opposition, often, to those with whom I'm usually most closely politically aligned- that is, the left. )

I'll come back a bit later (after I finish yet another overdue assignment- ugh, what is wrong with me???), I think, and elaborate, but I thought I'd throw this out there now and just see if anyone was interested in the topic.

Thank you!

Emily

Oh, Emily, what have you done! Now you've got me started! My short answer is no, I don't think that many (perhaps most) questions of either moral (or ethical) and epistemic importance are relative. Like you, this puts me on the opposite side of people who are otherwise my natural political allies.

From a moral standpoint, it puts me at odds with people who are very well-meaning but come profoundly different answers on questions related to, say, how to answer the religious right. I believe that once you open the door to 'whatever you believe is true actually is true' you have just muted your moral voice.

Epistemic relativism is even more problematic for me and I have positively made a pest of myself on these (and other) message boards by insisting that while we can express whatever opinions we wish to, none of us are entitled to a different set of facts. According to epistemic relativism, if you *genuinely* believe that the Sun orbits the Earth then no one can really say you are wrong. However, I strenuously disagree with that idea because it is simply objectively true that the Sun is the gravitational center of this solar system and by any reasonable definition of gravity coming out of physics, it dominates its little area of warped-spacetime.

I have a LOT more I could say about this but I'll read through the thread before continuing on. I'd say "don't get me started" but it's too late for that now. :)

[dreadgeek]

I disagree, what is morally "right" or "true" is entirely relative. Morality is a man-made construct and as such was moulded to whatever belief system it spawned from and, therefore, can only be "true" according to said belief system, but is by no means ultimately true (meaning it cannot exist without that system). Some morals are subjective according to culture or individual, however, others are more pan-human due to the very reason that they concern the survival of the species (a pan-human concern). Therefore, it stems more from the desire to survive (and the desire for those closest to ourselves to survive), a desire which exists in every other species.

Here's the problem that I see with saying that morality is relative. Since you talk about marginalized groups, let's talk about some of the things that have happened to marginalized groups which have, at other times and in other places, been considered moral. Let's do the heavy one first and talk about slavery. If what you are saying is true, that morality is relative, then there are times, places or worlds in which American-style chattel slavery is morally acceptable. I would argue that slavery is immoral because it reduces a human being to a mere object and that it is wrong to reduce human beings to mere objects. I would say that this is grounded in our basic humanness, people WANT to be self-determining and self-actualizing and slavery prevents both by its very nature.

Now, if morality is, in fact, relative then the above may not be true. If that is the case then one can imagine a population that has the misfortune of being enslaved becoming adjusted to that condition and, in fact, becoming happy within that condition. I would argue that I am not aware of any such population EVER having existed. My ancestors coped with being slaves, they had moments of happiness--the birth of a child, say--but these were moments of happiness that occurred despite the condition of being enslaved.



I often find it strange the way people in marginalised communities cling to morality as though without it discrimination of marginalised groups would run rampant.

I think we cling to morality because we are human beings.


I've actually found the case to be quite the opposite. Morality seems to have, at least partially, spawned discrimination in that it passes judgement (or worse) upon any act its own system deems as wrong.

Might that not be putting the cart before the horse? Might it be that humans will find some reason to discriminate and will then backfill in the why of it, usually wrapping it up in the moral language of, say, taboo or uncleanliness?


That act may be murder, or, on the other hand, it may be sex between two people of the same sex, or sex between two people of a different race, and so on and so forth.

I don't know about putting those two into the same moral bucket. One (murder) clearly harms others by its very nature while the other doesn't. I think that before society proscribes any given act 'X' it should always ask itself "is there some compelling reason why this should be sanctioned".


Oddly enough both sides, both the "bigots" and the "enlightened" seem to prefer to tout the other as undoubtedly immoral and their own perspective as undoubtedly moral. Why not use reason over moral codes? Who's morality is more moral and according to whom? An extremist who blows up a building or anything else is just as full of moral conviction as those who point at him as the epitome of immorality, the devil in disguise. What makes popular western or left-wing convictions more "true" than any other? Location? The mere fact that one happens to agree?

Well, that last question is the one I like to pull out on relativists, quite honestly. If all knowledge is relative and if all morality is relative, might it NOT be true that, say, Fred Phelps is correct and that all queer people are Satan-spawned demons bound for Hell? If whatever one believes is true is actually true then the only reason we might have for telling Phelps that he is full of it is that we disagree. For myself, I want a firmer intellectual foundation than "I don't like what you say and therefore what you say is wrong" to stand upon. Something similar applies to moral relativism. I would argue that, for instance, slavery is wrong--not wrong in the West, not wrong amongst the Left, not wrong when it's my ancestors but okay when it's your ancestors. Rather, I would argue that slavery is wrong because it violates something central, core and non-negotiable about human beings--namely that we belong to ourselves. That is true for my ancestors and it is true for everyone reading this post.

[Kobi]

Being an operationalist rather than a theorist...

I believe there are universal truths.

I believe there is human effort to find ways to actualize these universal truths in and through our human existence.

I believe the human effort to do so is an evolution which is guided by every day life, the decisions we make, the consequences or implications, expected and unexpected, which spur us to think and act and new and different ways.

I believe this process can only occur within a cultural context for to deny this would negate the existence of differing levels of evolutions and opportunity within different societies, and rob them of the opportunity for self development and identity.

Using the example above.....when the agricultural society of our country grew in unprecidented ways, we discovered the concept of a labor shortage. Needing a labor force in a different way meant looking at options, if any, and deciding on what basis an option was chosen. For a number of reasons we resorted to human trafficing to meet a need. This decision may have met a labor need but also resulted in new, never before encountered challenges i.e. who is this new labor force, how is the labor force to be viewed and treated etc.

In time, the arrival of these new peoples evolved into new trends in thought i.e. does one group of humans have the right to buy and sell another group of humans, and what other options are available to fill the need for labor etc.

During the industrial revolution, we again needed an influx of labor. And legalized immigration became the new way to solve labor needs.

It is a process in the development of the human concept of itself and the challenges it faces in living.

If one looks at the rapid development of the economic system in China, the effects on such on its population, and the effects on its culture, the parallels of its growing pains so resemble the American experience it is frightening. It is frightening because rather than evolving into changes and taking its people with it, it is taking western concepts and actions and imposing them on an unsuspecting people resulting in a totally different experience than was intended. It is both fascinating and disturbing to watch.

As Jane Wagner once said....reality is nothing more than a collective hunch.....to which I would add......at a certain time, in a certain place by a certain group of people.

[dreadgeek]

"...ordinarily, we think that on a factual question like the one about American prehistory, there is a way things are that is independent of us and our beliefs about it--an objective fact of the matter, as we may put it as to where the first Americans originated. We are not necessarily fact-objectivists (emphasis original) in this sense about all domains of judgement. About morality, for example, some people, philosophers included, are inclined to be relativists: they hold that there are many alternative moral codes specifying what counts as good or bad conduct, but no facts by virtue of which some of these codes are more 'correct' than any of the others...These sorts of relativism about value matters are debatable, of course, and still debated. However, even if we find them ultimately implausible they do not strike us as absurd. But on a factual question such as the one about the origins of the first Americans, we are inclined to think, surely, there is just some objective fact of the matter. We may not know what it this fact of the matter is, but, having formed an interest in the question we seek to know it..."

Paul A Boghossian -- Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism

I quoted him at length because I think this goes to the core of the matter (and, quite honestly, for the purposes of this discussion I want to keep to the issue of epistemology, in part, because it's the more tractable problem). I have often wondered if people who claim that all knowledge is relative and socially constructed *really* believe that or are they saying something that they haven't thought through all the way. If the former, then one might expect folks who believe that to, say, walk off of tall buildings. If all knowledge is relative, if there really isn't a world 'out there', then gravity should be culturally constructed as well. Yet, in all cultures, and in all times, human beings have been subject to 1-G of gravity. It wasn't until, what, 1962 or 63 that a human being ever experienced weightlessness for any length of time. Our bodies are products of 1-G of gravity pulling on us and 14.5 psi pushing us down from the weight of the atmosphere.

Now, some might claim that there are other, equally valid explanations for why things fall to the ground when dropped that doesn't invoke Einsteinian gravity but I think this is a kind of dodge. Take the two models (whatever they might be) and determine which of them is best able to deal with the behavior of various systems subject to the model. For example, the Einstein model of gravity allows us to account for things like gravity lensing where a star appears somewhat out of phase from its actual location relative to us because the light from that star is bent around a large gravitational mass (and yes, the universe really does work like this. It's been confirmed numerous times from observations taken during eclipses). The only model of gravity that can explain this is Einstein's. Newton's model can't although, for most ordinary purposes, we use Newton and not Einstein. The reason being is that Newton's approximations work well enough for the kinds of purposes we typically apply gravitational physics to. However, there is an exception--GPS. Because satellites are in motion and because the Earth is *also* in motion, GPS satellites have to take into account relativistic effects or else the GPS would be off--now, for your TomTom the amount of error isn't going to matter very much (I believe it's a matter of feet) but for military and aircraft navigational applications a few feet is all the difference in the world.

No other system of knowledge can account for this--the fact that other cultures don't *have* this problem is irrelevant here. Once a culture reaches a certain level of technological sophistication, they will have a problem that looks very much like the GPS problem and the solution will have to take into account relativistic effects. That's what I mean when I talk about a world 'out there'.

Do people who believe in strong epistemic relativism think that the Earth has existed for ~ 4.5 billion years? Do they think the universe has existed for ~ 14.5 billion years? If so, who was constructing the knowledge?

[dreadgeek]

As Jane Wagner once said....reality is nothing more than a collective hunch.....to which I would add......at a certain time, in a certain place by a certain group of people.


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I'm curious, do you think this applies to the physical world? In other words do you believe that there are any places, any people on this Earth for whom water did *not* freeze at 32 degrees F (0 C)? Do you think that there are any people or any place or any time at which a rock of some throwable weight wasn't subject to force which is equal to its mass multiplied by its acceleration? Now, I will admit that F=ma (Newton's second law) is an approximation but it is a close *enough* approximation that for most applications we can use it (for example, all space shots are calculated using Newton instead of Einstein because the math is more tractable). However, that equation describes an approximation of a physical reality that was true before Newton came along to explain it. All Newton did was quantify what is happening.

This is the problem I have with statements along the lines of the Wagner quote: it ignores the physical world. There have been cultures (including Western) that *believed* that the Sun orbited the Earth but every single one of them (including this one) was absolutely and completely wrong about that. The belief that the Sun orbited the Earth didn't change the physical reality. The same can be said about, for instance, the cause of thunder and lightning--people have, until fairly recently, believed that this was caused by the thunder god, or the sky god, or what-have-you but at no point was any of that *true* and to say it was 'true for them' really misses the point. Would one accept that the paramedic who is about to give you CPR believes that your heart is in your feet? Would one accept that this is 'true for them' while you die because they are giving you a foot massage? Should one accept that?

The other thing, the contradictory thing, is that the idea that reality is just a hunch is, itself, an epistemic statement. I'm only being half-cheeky here when I say that if the strong epistemic relativists are correct then their argument negates itself. If all of reality is just a collective hunch and not based upon some objective, empirical reality that would hold true even if this universe never contained a single sentient being, then that statement itself is the baseline reality and thus it negates the idea that there is no truth 'outside' our ability to construct it socially.

[little man]

is it just me or did the conversation just shift from philosophical theory to physical science?

[dreadgeek]

is it just me or did the conversation just shift from philosophical theory to physical science?

no, it didn't. I'm merely asking questions about epistemology using the physical world. I could just as easily asked if there are any *valid* worlds in which Barack Obama is the current President of the United States and that he succeeded George W. Bush who succeeded Bill Clinton. The question I'm driving at is do people believe that there is no objective world 'out there' that is at all amenable to empirical investigation. That's a non-trivial question when talking about epistemology and because (most) people will concede that the physical sciences can actually *demonstrate* their knowledge in an empirically valid fashion, I used those examples.

[Kobi]

I believe I said there are universal truths. Humans interpret or describe universal truths based on their perception of reality at a given time. These perceptions change over time as we gather more and more knowledge. Hence we are saying, it appears, the same thing.

I'm curious, do you think this applies to the physical world? In other words do you believe that there are any places, any people on this Earth for whom water did *not* freeze at 32 degrees F (0 C)? Do you think that there are any people or any place or any time at which a rock of some throwable weight wasn't subject to force which is equal to its mass multiplied by its acceleration? Now, I will admit that F=ma (Newton's second law) is an approximation but it is a close *enough* approximation that for most applications we can use it (for example, all space shots are calculated using Newton instead of Einstein because the math is more tractable). However, that equation describes an approximation of a physical reality that was true before Newton came along to explain it. All Newton did was quantify what is happening.

This is the problem I have with statements along the lines of the Wagner quote: it ignores the physical world. There have been cultures (including Western) that *believed* that the Sun orbited the Earth but every single one of them (including this one) was absolutely and completely wrong about that. The belief that the Sun orbited the Earth didn't change the physical reality. The same can be said about, for instance, the cause of thunder and lightning--people have, until fairly recently, believed that this was caused by the thunder god, or the sky god, or what-have-you but at no point was any of that *true* and to say it was 'true for them' really misses the point. Would one accept that the paramedic who is about to give you CPR believes that your heart is in your feet? Would one accept that this is 'true for them' while you die because they are giving you a foot massage? Should one accept that?

The other thing, the contradictory thing, is that the idea that reality is just a hunch is, itself, an epistemic statement. I'm only being half-cheeky here when I say that if the strong epistemic relativists are correct then their argument negates itself. If all of reality is just a collective hunch and not based upon some objective, empirical reality that would hold true even if this universe never contained a single sentient being, then that statement itself is the baseline reality and thus it negates the idea that there is no truth 'outside' our ability to construct it socially.

[dreadgeek]

I believe I said there are universal truths. Humans interpret or describe universal truths based on their perception of reality at a given time. These perceptions change over time as we gather more and more knowledge. Hence we are saying, it appears, the same thing.



I must have misread you then. I thought that you were agreeing with the Wagner quotation. My apologies.

Cheers
Aj

[Kobi]

I was agreeing with Wagner.

At one time, people thought the world was flat. It was their truth, at that time. Then, we discovered the world was round. A new truth appeared.

It would be presumptuous for me as a mere human to think everything I take for granted as truth at this point in time is the end all and be all of the truth. At some point, someone may indeed be able to prove a new truth.

Hence, a collective hunch is an agreed upon reality which is subject to change as our knowledge expands.

I must have misread you then. I thought that you were agreeing with the Wagner quotation. My apologies.

Cheers
Aj

[dreadgeek]

I was agreeing with Wagner.

At one time, people thought the world was flat. It was their truth, at that time. Then, we discovered the world was round. A new truth appeared.

It would be presumptuous for me as a mere human to think everything I take for granted as truth at this point in time is the end all and be all of the truth. At some point, someone may indeed be able to prove a new truth.

Hence, a collective hunch is an agreed upon reality which is subject to change as our knowledge expands.

I'm curious, why call it their truth and not their belief? It wasn't true, they believed it to be true but that didn't make it any less a false belief for all that. I understand that people do not old beliefs they *know* to be false but it seems that calling something 'their truth' gives a false belief a pride of place it does not merit. Did a 'new' truth appear or did humans finally get it correct? I would argue the latter. Certainly, all our knowledge (well, very large swaths of it) should come with the proviso of "to the best of our knowledge, at this time, subject to modification without prior notice". However, when that day comes in some knowledge domain or another what would be so wrong about stating "in 2010, humans believed this to be true. They were, of course, wrong about that because...".

[little man]

no, it didn't. I'm merely asking questions about epistemology using the physical world. I could just as easily asked if there are any *valid* worlds in which Barack Obama is the current President of the United States and that he succeeded George W. Bush who succeeded Bill Clinton. The question I'm driving at is do people believe that there is no objective world 'out there' that is at all amenable to empirical investigation. That's a non-trivial question when talking about epistemology and because (most) people will concede that the physical sciences can actually *demonstrate* their knowledge in an empirically valid fashion, I used those examples.

thank you, i see where this came into play now.

i'm interested in both the topic and the discussion, but will admit i'm having some difficulty following. i am lacking in formal education and the types of discussion that come with higher education.

i apologize for the interruption, and will likely do it again when i'm lost.


thanks!

[Kobi]

Had to think about this but again, I believe we are saying the same thing using different words.

Call it truth or belief or hamburger, it is still the prevailing agreed upon thought/perception at a given time which is based on our understanding of a certain body of knowledge which is intrepreted in a certain way using certain words and concepts which are agreed upon to reflect the situation.

Simplistic interpretation of above....reality is a collective hunch at a certain time, in a certain place by a certain group of people using a certain criteria by which to evaluate a certain thing.

Our knowledge and the ways we are able to apply it are growing at a tremendous rate. So, all in all, maybe the question should be is there an ultimate truth, an end all be all truth, at which point humans would say yes we are done searching because this is it. Or, is the potential for knowledge so great that our search for truth(s) is an infinite project.












I'm curious, why call it their truth and not their belief? It wasn't true, they believed it to be true but that didn't make it any less a false belief for all that. I understand that people do not old beliefs they *know* to be false but it seems that calling something 'their truth' gives a false belief a pride of place it does not merit. Did a 'new' truth appear or did humans finally get it correct? I would argue the latter. Certainly, all our knowledge (well, very large swaths of it) should come with the proviso of "to the best of our knowledge, at this time, subject to modification without prior notice". However, when that day comes in some knowledge domain or another what would be so wrong about stating "in 2010, humans believed this to be true. They were, of course, wrong about that because...".

[Kobi]

Hi little man,

These discussions can be very confusing and hard to follow. Sometimes I like to call them word physics i.e. sounds impressive and important with big words and all but whats the bottom line. Can be tricky to say the least.

Jump in, we are all learning together.

thank you, i see where this came into play now.

i'm interested in both the topic and the discussion, but will admit i'm having some difficulty following. i am lacking in formal education and the types of discussion that come with higher education.

i apologize for the interruption, and will likely do it again when i'm lost.


thanks!

[Nat]

I'm curious, why call it their truth and not their belief? It wasn't true, they believed it to be true but that didn't make it any less a false belief for all that. I understand that people do not old beliefs they *know* to be false but it seems that calling something 'their truth' gives a false belief a pride of place it does not merit. Did a 'new' truth appear or did humans finally get it correct? I would argue the latter. Certainly, all our knowledge (well, very large swaths of it) should come with the proviso of "to the best of our knowledge, at this time, subject to modification without prior notice". However, when that day comes in some knowledge domain or another what would be so wrong about stating "in 2010, humans believed this to be true. They were, of course, wrong about that because...".

I think this is an interesting question.

I know that my own tendency toward using the word "truth" or even "fact" about beliefs from the past which have been proven untrue has to do with imagining myself in the world of the past while speaking of it.

If I imagine myself in that world, the common "knowledge", the perceived "truth" and accepted "facts" seem to make up the skeletal structure of that world. The "beliefs" of that world would be something I might imagine as soft tissue.

The way you state things there at the end bridges the gap for me - "believed to be true" makes perfect sense to me - though I don't know if I would spontaneously come to these words on my own, nor would I mind referring to those past false understandings as "truths".

I think the word "truth" is also murkier because it is used so much in a spiritual context. If religions are always seeking the "Truth", if people are always looking for their inner "truth" - it's already understood that this definition of truth has nothing to do with physical reality and facts. So in some ways, "truth" might even be its own antonym.

[Kobi]

Is it a false understanding or an incomplete understanding? Or, perhaps did we ask the wrong question?

Example. A generalize agreement over centuries and today is the sky is blue. But by todays knowledge we know that when transmitted light such as sunlight enters our atmosphere it collides with the oxygen and nitrogen atoms. The color with the shorter wavelength is scattered more by this collision. Because violet and blue are the shortest wavelengths the sky appears to be violet / blue. But because our eyes are more sensitive to blue light than they are violet light, we perceive the sky as blue.

So is the sky blue because it is blue or is it blue because human eyes perceive it is blue? Or is it blue because the neurochemistry of the brain is telling the eye what it is perceiving is the color blue? Or, have I now totally confused even myself?



I think this is an interesting question.

I know that my own tendency toward using the word "truth" or even "fact" about beliefs from the past which have been proven untrue has to do with imagining myself in the world of the past while speaking of it.

If I imagine myself in that world, the common "knowledge", the perceived "truth" and accepted "facts" seem to make up the skeletal structure of that world. The "beliefs" of that world would be something I might imagine as soft tissue.

The way you state things there at the end bridges the gap for me - "believed to be true" makes perfect sense to me - though I don't know if I would spontaneously come to these words on my own, nor would I mind referring to those past false understandings as "truths".

I think the word "truth" is also murkier because it is used so much in a spiritual context. If religions are always seeking the "Truth", if people are always looking for their inner "truth" - it's already understood that this definition of truth has nothing to do with physical reality and facts. So in some ways, "truth" might even be its own antonym.

[little man]

Is it a false understanding or an incomplete understanding? Or, perhaps did we ask the wrong question?

Example. A generalize agreement over centuries and today is the sky is blue. But by todays knowledge we know that when transmitted light such as sunlight enters our atmosphere it collides with the oxygen and nitrogen atoms. The color with the shorter wavelength is scattered more by this collision. Because violet and blue are the shortest wavelengths the sky appears to be violet / blue. But because our eyes are more sensitive to blue light than they are violet light, we perceive the sky as blue.

So is the sky blue because it is blue or is it blue because human eyes perceive it is blue? Or is it blue because the neurochemistry of the brain is telling the eye what it is perceiving is the color blue? Or, have I now totally confused even myself?



for me, this tracks back to relativity. relative to time, perception and (as you've stated) generally agreed upon notions.

if you take into account folks who are color blind, animals that don't see color...where does that leave the 'factuality' of "the sky is blue"?

[Kobi]

Good point. Kind of gives new meaning to...in the eye of the beholder.

for me, this tracks back to relativity. relative to time, perception and (as you've stated) generally agreed upon notions.

if you take into account folks who are color blind, animals that don't see color...where does that leave the 'factuality' of "the sky is blue"?

[dreadgeek]

for me, this tracks back to relativity. relative to time, perception and (as you've stated) generally agreed upon notions.

if you take into account folks who are color blind, animals that don't see color...where does that leave the 'factuality' of "the sky is blue"?

To say 'the sky is blue' is a close approximation and true enough for our species. Ultimately, we perceive it as blue for the reasons that Kobi gets into (more on that in a minute) and that makes it true for all the members of homo sapiens that can see color. (I suspect, given WHY we have color vision and where it came from, that if chimps, gorillas, orangutans and bonobos could talk that they would agree with us about the color of the sky. I suspect that the old-world primates probably would as well because our visual systems evolved to solve the same kind of problem.)

I want to make clear that when I'm talking about truths I am talking (mostly) about a localized (meaning here on Earth) phenomena. Sci-fi geek and aspiring science fiction author that I am, I can easily imagine sentient beings that see into a different part of the electromagnetic spectrum than we do who would see, for instance, radio waves or something.

Is it a false understanding or an incomplete understanding? Or, perhaps did we ask the wrong question?

Example. A generalize agreement over centuries and today is the sky is blue. But by todays knowledge we know that when transmitted light such as sunlight enters our atmosphere it collides with the oxygen and nitrogen atoms. The color with the shorter wavelength is scattered more by this collision. Because violet and blue are the shortest wavelengths the sky appears to be violet / blue. But because our eyes are more sensitive to blue light than they are violet light, we perceive the sky as blue.

So is the sky blue because it is blue or is it blue because human eyes perceive it is blue? Or is it blue because the neurochemistry of the brain is telling the eye what it is perceiving is the color blue? Or, have I now totally confused even myself?



LOL. I follow you. I give a lot of thought to this kind of thing. Since vision is a neurochemical process what we're really talking about is that our eyes evolved to see a particular part of the light spectrum and so we see the sky as blue. The sky is not *really* blue. However, the reasons why we see the sky as blue are objective and empirical. Any animal that has eyes tuned by evolution to be sensitive to the same part of the spectrum as ours will agree with us. If we ever meet another technological species we would likely agree on what was happening in our eyes even if they saw a different part of the spectrum than we do--they might disagree with us on what 'visible' light means but they would recognize, as do we, that what we call light is the same thing as microwaves which is the same thing as radio waves. I can easily imagine a slightly different homo sapiens with a slightly different visual system that is, say, closer to bees which see further into the violet end of the spectrum than we do. What bees see as color is valid and genuine for them. However, if a bee Stephen Hawking were to sit down with the primate Stephen Hawking, they would agree on *what* light was they would just disagree on how one defines 'visible' light.

The question of 'ultimate' truth is stickier although, again, I still think that there are some ultimate truths that can be known. Almost ALL of them fall into the realm of the physical sciences and all of the examples I can think of off the top of my head certainly fall into them. Unfortunately, we have an inconveniently small sample size for knowing about ultimate truth claims regarding living things because we only have the living things here. However, everywhere we have looked in the Universe we have seen certain things:

Gravity holds throughout the Universe.
Light is the fastest moving thing throughout the Universe.
As far as we can tell, all three laws of thermodynamics hold throughout the Universe.
This means that, most likely, very large swaths of chemistry will probably be true throughout the Universe.

One of the reasons why I bring in the physical sciences is because much of what we have discovered appears to be invariant wherever we look. When talking about truth claims the sciences give us a means of testing our claims, a language to use to talk about where we have it right, where we have it wrong and where we have no idea what-so-ever. For me, the physical sciences form the foundation of how we know about the world we live in. We can argue about why the Civil War happened. We can argue about the relative truth claims undergirding the various religions. We can debate whether Marx or Smith or Ricardo or Rand or Hayek was right about economics. However, there is nothing so real as a rock that has landed on your toe or that glass that you knocked off the table which shattered when it hit the floor.

[dreadgeek]

Had to think about this but again, I believe we are saying the same thing using different words.

Call it truth or belief or hamburger, it is still the prevailing agreed upon thought/perception at a given time which is based on our understanding of a certain body of knowledge which is intrepreted in a certain way using certain words and concepts which are agreed upon to reflect the situation.

Simplistic interpretation of above....reality is a collective hunch at a certain time, in a certain place by a certain group of people using a certain criteria by which to evaluate a certain thing.

Our knowledge and the ways we are able to apply it are growing at a tremendous rate. So, all in all, maybe the question should be is there an ultimate truth, an end all be all truth, at which point humans would say yes we are done searching because this is it. Or, is the potential for knowledge so great that our search for truth(s) is an infinite project.




That's an interesting question. I think there are SOME ultimate truths but I think that there are probably only a handful of them and almost all of them are going to fall into one of the physical sciences. The Second Law of Thermodynamics is one such Ultimate Truth. As one eminent physicist put it:

"The law that entropy always increases holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell's equations — then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation — well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation." — Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (1927)

I think to know what ultimate truths there are, we will ultimately have to meet another sentient species at or beyond our technological level to see what they hit upon. I expect that if we ever do have such an encounter, we'll agree on the speed of light, we'll agree that the Universe is expanding, they will have some kind of formulation approximating classical mechanics, they'll have some kind of formulation approximating Einstein's theories of relativity, they'll have something along the lines of the atomic model and we'll agree on things like the approximate value of pi and they'll have something recognizable as quantum mechanics. I suspect that they'll understand our chemistry although not, necessarily, our organic chemistry if they aren't from a world where life is carbon based as it is here. (Silicon based life is possible, it just didn't happen here.)

After that, I think the areas that we would agree upon would fall off rather quickly. I don't think we can make any kind of pretensions to Ultimate Truth claims about the purpose of the Universe or the nature of a divine being if any such thing exists. All our religious claims are local affairs. All our history is local (although I still think that there are truth claims about history that can be made). By local, I mean here on Earth and I'm willing to be generous and extend it out to the whole of the solar system but not beyond that.

[Kobi]

This is something I must think about as the mention of the second law of thermodynamics made my eyes glaze over. Brain fatigue perhaps. Fresh eyes and brain may help. Will revisit tomorrow.

That's an interesting question. I think there are SOME ultimate truths but I think that there are probably only a handful of them and almost all of them are going to fall into one of the physical sciences. The Second Law of Thermodynamics is one such Ultimate Truth. As one eminent physicist put it:

"The law that entropy always increases holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell's equations — then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation — well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation." — Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (1927)

I think to know what ultimate truths there are, we will ultimately have to meet another sentient species at or beyond our technological level to see what they hit upon. I expect that if we ever do have such an encounter, we'll agree on the speed of light, we'll agree that the Universe is expanding, they will have some kind of formulation approximating classical mechanics, they'll have some kind of formulation approximating Einstein's theories of relativity, they'll have something along the lines of the atomic model and we'll agree on things like the approximate value of pi and they'll have something recognizable as quantum mechanics. I suspect that they'll understand our chemistry although not, necessarily, our organic chemistry if they aren't from a world where life is carbon based as it is here. (Silicon based life is possible, it just didn't happen here.)

After that, I think the areas that we would agree upon would fall off rather quickly. I don't think we can make any kind of pretensions to Ultimate Truth claims about the purpose of the Universe or the nature of a divine being if any such thing exists. All our religious claims are local affairs. All our history is local (although I still think that there are truth claims about history that can be made). By local, I mean here on Earth and I'm willing to be generous and extend it out to the whole of the solar system but not beyond that.

[Kobi]

After careful thought and brain gymnastics, I am thinking we disagree on a central premise. I believe you are saying their are absolutes truths for which no other explanation will ever be found by humankind as a species.

I believe otherwise. I believe anything, including the second law of thermodynamics , can be proven to be a false truth or an incomplete truth. I think as we develop new techologies and ask new questions in our research, the possibility exists for new explanations or clarifications for previously held truths.
That's an interesting question. I think there are SOME ultimate truths but I think that there are probably only a handful of them and almost all of them are going to fall into one of the physical sciences. The Second Law of Thermodynamics is one such Ultimate Truth. As one eminent physicist put it:

"The law that entropy always increases holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell's equations — then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation — well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation." — Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (1927)

I think to know what ultimate truths there are, we will ultimately have to meet another sentient species at or beyond our technological level to see what they hit upon. I expect that if we ever do have such an encounter, we'll agree on the speed of light, we'll agree that the Universe is expanding, they will have some kind of formulation approximating classical mechanics, they'll have some kind of formulation approximating Einstein's theories of relativity, they'll have something along the lines of the atomic model and we'll agree on things like the approximate value of pi and they'll have something recognizable as quantum mechanics. I suspect that they'll understand our chemistry although not, necessarily, our organic chemistry if they aren't from a world where life is carbon based as it is here. (Silicon based life is possible, it just didn't happen here.)

After that, I think the areas that we would agree upon would fall off rather quickly. I don't think we can make any kind of pretensions to Ultimate Truth claims about the purpose of the Universe or the nature of a divine being if any such thing exists. All our religious claims are local affairs. All our history is local (although I still think that there are truth claims about history that can be made). By local, I mean here on Earth and I'm willing to be generous and extend it out to the whole of the solar system but not beyond that.

[dreadgeek]

After careful thought and brain gymnastics, I am thinking we disagree on a central premise. I believe you are saying their are absolutes truths for which no other explanation will ever be found by humankind as a species.

I believe otherwise. I believe anything, including the second law of thermodynamics , can be proven to be a false truth or an incomplete truth. I think as we develop new techologies and ask new questions in our research, the possibility exists for new explanations or clarifications for previously held truths.


That's not *exactly* what I'm saying. I always hold out the possibility that, for instance, the laws of thermodynamics could be overturned although I think that's vanishingly improbable. I like to use a scale from 0 - 1 with 0 being "certainly untrue" and 1 being "certainly true". Very large swaths of physics, for instance, I think are in the .7 to .9 range. It's *possible* but extraordinarily improbable that we're wrong. There are other areas, string theory for instance, where I have moved from the .4 - .5 range (probably true) to the .1 - .3 range (almost certainly not true). I'm never absolutely certain because of one of the sayings that I keep on the wall of my study: "When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is probably wrong."

That said, I think that most of the time we can proceed as-if some matter were settled until Nature, which always has the last word, says otherwise. Now, there are some areas that I'm pretty close to certain. The atomic model, the quantum mechanical model, the Einstein model of gravity and space-time and, on this planet, evolution are all .8 or .9 certainties for me. If any of those are wrong then not only are their respective domains irreparably broken but we, all 6 billion of us, are living in a very elaborate collective hallucination. What I mean by this is that, for instance, if the atomic and quantum mechanical models are wrong then you aren't reading this and I'm not typing this because computers don't work. If evolution is wrong then Nature has a lot to answer for because there's all kinds of genetic evidence that makes no sense except in the light of evolution. If thermodynamics is wrong then, again, Nature needs to explain why the flat tire I had on my bike a couple of weeks ago will never spontaneously inflate itself and why the coffee cup one of my cats broke will never spontaneously reform itself. (I would put the 2nd law in the .01 certainty range because of the kinds of examples above.)

There are no areas of science that I think are settled in that there's no more work to be done in them. If you think that's what I'm saying then that's entirely not what I’m saying. However, I AM saying that, barring contradicting evidence, I can proceed in my field of bioinformatics *as if* the chemistry underlying biology was a, more or less, settled matter at least in the broad outline and that the physics underlying the chemistry is also a settled matter, again at least in the broad outline.

I'm curious about something. How do you deal with past false truths? The reason I'm asking is because the examples I use to play with these ideas in my head all, generally, orbit around either the physical sciences or questions related to things that people believed in the past. For example, what kind of truth value would you give to the 19th century belief that I, as a black woman, was not quite really human. Was it true then but not true now? Was it false then and false now? The reason I ask is NOT--and I want to make this clear--because I think your'e racist but because it's a tough question. If we want to grant 19th century people that their worldview was consistent, valid and *true* and we are going to grant their beliefs the dignity of saying "well, it was true then" it begs the question of when racial bigotry became an injustice.

For example, no one ever complains that it is unjust that 18 months old infants aren't allowed to drive cars or fly jumbo jets. Everyone recognizes that 18 month olds lack the physical or mental abilities to do so and so, forbidding them from those activities isn't an injustice. Even if there were some extraordinarily precocious 18 month old who could it still wouldn't be an injustice since the *average* behavior of children of that age completely justified society forbidding kids from doing those things. So quite a bit turns on how we treat false beliefs from the past. If we grant those beliefs that were based in bigotry the dignity of calling them truths--even if we do not believe them ourselves--then what grounds do we have to claim that an injustice was being perpetrated? If blacks really WERE not-quite-human in the 19th century then on what grounds can we say that slavery was actually an evil? Is it an evil to keep a pet dog? Is it an evil to keep a cow? Slavery is an evil because it is wrong to use or treat humans as mere instruments but we draw a line between humans and other, less neurologically gifted, animals.

Do you see what I'm driving at?

[Kobi]

I might see what you are driving at. Then again I might not LOL.

Your field of expertise seems to be in the physical sciences and emperical data. My expertise is in the social sciences and quantifing things isnt quite as exact or easy.

You look at probability and in assigning it a value, proceed according to where on your scale something fits i.e. if there is a high probability, you can go with it. If there is a low probability, you might be more hesitant.

I look at possibility and try not to assign it a value judgement because in doing so, I limit its potential expressions. Any value judgement I give something automatically skews the results and pushes something in the direction of my value judgement.

Are we on the same page or am I still not understanding your perspective?

To answer your illustration of the history of slavery and how to quanitfy this historically....from my perspective.....I wouldnt want to give it any value that implies judgement for in doing so I am denying the potential process that may have been evolving during that time. For example, I would wonder if slave owners had any dealing with persons of other races before they had an economic need for laborers. I would want to know if they had preconceived notions and where they might have come from. Or, perhaps, did the slave traders introduce the idea that the people they were enslaving in Africa perpetuate the idea of savages and subhuman concepts in order to bolster and find support for their business - i.e. weird marketing technique.

Seeing I wasnt around back then and racism as a concept hadnt yet been developed, it behooves me to describe the process in its economic context rather than give it a value judgement based on current understandings.

I presume it might be easier to say were people inherently racist, even tho the concept didnt exist then, or was their behavior the result of something else.

I guess I am trying not to ignore the evolutionary aspects of the human experience by judging things based on an understanding that was not available at the time.

Am I making sense?









That's not *exactly* what I'm saying. I always hold out the possibility that, for instance, the laws of thermodynamics could be overturned although I think that's vanishingly improbable. I like to use a scale from 0 - 1 with 0 being "certainly untrue" and 1 being "certainly true". Very large swaths of physics, for instance, I think are in the .7 to .9 range. It's *possible* but extraordinarily improbable that we're wrong. There are other areas, string theory for instance, where I have moved from the .4 - .5 range (probably true) to the .1 - .3 range (almost certainly not true). I'm never absolutely certain because of one of the sayings that I keep on the wall of my study: "When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is probably wrong."

That said, I think that most of the time we can proceed as-if some matter were settled until Nature, which always has the last word, says otherwise. Now, there are some areas that I'm pretty close to certain. The atomic model, the quantum mechanical model, the Einstein model of gravity and space-time and, on this planet, evolution are all .8 or .9 certainties for me. If any of those are wrong then not only are their respective domains irreparably broken but we, all 6 billion of us, are living in a very elaborate collective hallucination. What I mean by this is that, for instance, if the atomic and quantum mechanical models are wrong then you aren't reading this and I'm not typing this because computers don't work. If evolution is wrong then Nature has a lot to answer for because there's all kinds of genetic evidence that makes no sense except in the light of evolution. If thermodynamics is wrong then, again, Nature needs to explain why the flat tire I had on my bike a couple of weeks ago will never spontaneously inflate itself and why the coffee cup one of my cats broke will never spontaneously reform itself. (I would put the 2nd law in the .01 certainty range because of the kinds of examples above.)

There are no areas of science that I think are settled in that there's no more work to be done in them. If you think that's what I'm saying then that's entirely not what I’m saying. However, I AM saying that, barring contradicting evidence, I can proceed in my field of bioinformatics *as if* the chemistry underlying biology was a, more or less, settled matter at least in the broad outline and that the physics underlying the chemistry is also a settled matter, again at least in the broad outline.

I'm curious about something. How do you deal with past false truths? The reason I'm asking is because the examples I use to play with these ideas in my head all, generally, orbit around either the physical sciences or questions related to things that people believed in the past. For example, what kind of truth value would you give to the 19th century belief that I, as a black woman, was not quite really human. Was it true then but not true now? Was it false then and false now? The reason I ask is NOT--and I want to make this clear--because I think your'e racist but because it's a tough question. If we want to grant 19th century people that their worldview was consistent, valid and *true* and we are going to grant their beliefs the dignity of saying "well, it was true then" it begs the question of when racial bigotry became an injustice.

For example, no one ever complains that it is unjust that 18 months old infants aren't allowed to drive cars or fly jumbo jets. Everyone recognizes that 18 month olds lack the physical or mental abilities to do so and so, forbidding them from those activities isn't an injustice. Even if there were some extraordinarily precocious 18 month old who could it still wouldn't be an injustice since the *average* behavior of children of that age completely justified society forbidding kids from doing those things. So quite a bit turns on how we treat false beliefs from the past. If we grant those beliefs that were based in bigotry the dignity of calling them truths--even if we do not believe them ourselves--then what grounds do we have to claim that an injustice was being perpetrated? If blacks really WERE not-quite-human in the 19th century then on what grounds can we say that slavery was actually an evil? Is it an evil to keep a pet dog? Is it an evil to keep a cow? Slavery is an evil because it is wrong to use or treat humans as mere instruments but we draw a line between humans and other, less neurologically gifted, animals.

Do you see what I'm driving at?

[EnderD_503]

Ok, just a heads up, I wrote up this post last weekend and was going to reread it and post it, but since I've been at work practically 24/7 the last week I didn't get a chance to do either. This is in response to Emmy and atomiczombie, for the rest who quoted me, some of your responses are addressed in some way in the post since they are similar to what Emmy and atmiczombie addressed, but I will post again later to try and clarify as far as those responses are concerned. Excuse the typos if any and rushed nature of the post, I didn't get a chance to reread. Here it be:

Thanks for your response Emmy.

In your first paragraph you write that “if the aim here is to show that an act can be right or wrong only insofar as people judge it to be, I don’t think the case has been made.” I’m curious about the reasoning behind your objection to the idea that morality (or the “right” or “wrong” nature of a given act) is entirely dependant upon the existence of man-made belief systems. What evidence is there to suggest that these acts inherently contain any moral substance when examined outside their respective systems? Belief systems are very much like a codex for the interpretation of information. Without the system or the aligning discourse they are stripped of moral meaning. For example, the end of human life on earth is one that is looked upon as negative, wrong, evil, bad, generally an unfortunate turn of events and yet take away the human desire to survive in that judgement and said apocalypse is neither positive nor negative; it simply is. The same goes for any act or event. What lends an act or an event its rightness or wrongness (particularly if one does not hold any religious belief, or any belief whatever in a sentient higher power)? What inherently grants an act moral meaning?


However, if the crucial point you make in your first paragraph is instead that particular moral codes, developed and upheld by particular cultures, must be remembered to be cultural products -and not, a priori, correct in their moral judgments - I'm with you entirely.

I do agree that one must remember that a particular moral code is a cultural product, however, I do not agree that there exists any inherently correct moral judgement. What causes one to be a more correct moral judgement than the other? Again, one requires that the judgement be made according to a particular system, otherwise it can be easily interpreted in a myriad of ways. The crux of my argument is: what determines the moral nature of a given act, if not man-made systems?

Both you and atomiczombie asked similar questions about my discrimination example and so I'm going to answer you both of you, particularly regarding what you both thought appeared to be a contradiction in my argument. Before I began I would like to say that my argument involves inherent morality, meaning a moral code that exists beyond the human mind and that is, thusly, universal.

I would also like to point out that, implicit in your argument, I contend, is the notion that discrimination against target groups is a bad thing. (And yes, I certainly agree :)) But what underlies that assumption if not a moral judgment?


I find it interesting that you say this. I am wondering if you mean the same thing as I mean when I talk about reductionism. If so, then might that evaluation be a judgement too? What I am getting at is that making evaluations about whether or not something is say, "discrimination" or not, is implying that discrimination is wrong, or at the very least that some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness. At least that is what I hear you saying, and if I am wrong then please correct me.

I would like to clarify that nowhere in my post did I state that discrimination was inherently wrong. To evaluate something as discrimination is not a proclamation of its inherent wrongness. It is not an implication of wrongness until connotation is applied (which typically implies adherence to a specific system of thought) to meaning. Context, here, again implies system of thought. For example, within certain discourses the discrimination of individuals according to specific racial or sexual characteristics is not given a negative connotation, while in others it is. Discrimination itself is only positive or negative according to discourse, but is inherently neither.

Atomiczombie, you mentioned you were a philosophy student. You must certainly be familiar with Derrida and his Dissemination, then. Just as one may read a text according to a certain system (for example, what one would take from Milton's Paradise Lost using a Marxist lense differs from what one would take using Heidegger or Freud as a decoder), so can one read an act according to a certain system. Derrida wrote that when one reads a text, one both reads and creates, and that is arguably also the case with an act. One witnesses an act either directly or indirectly, and as this is done the act is also analysed and interpreted.

To clarify my meaning further: I do not need to believe that discrimination is inherently wrong in order to disagree with it or even to fight against it. I am both able to recognise that discrimination is not inherently wrong, as well as that it is not advantageous to my personal survival, yet, simultaneously, I recognise that what is disadvantageous to me or to the majority of human beings is not equatable with inherent wrongness since that would require a sort of universal archetype for right and wrong (similar to Aquinas's discussion of the goodness of god in relation to human and natural goodness discussed in his Summa Theologica, or similar to Plato's cave allegory). If morality is not man-made then it must come from some source, but if moral questions require a so-called human element then they are not absolute nor universal. As Nietzsche wrote in On Truth and Lies In A Non-moral Sense: "In some remote corner of the universe, flickering in the light of the countless solar systems into which it had been poured, there was once a planet on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and most mendacious minute in the 'history of the world'; but a minute was all it was. After nature had drawn just a few more breaths the planet froze and the clever animals had to die. Someone could invent a fable like this and yet they would still not have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, how insubstantial and transitory, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature; there were eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further mission that might extend beyond the bounds of human life. Rather, the intellect is human, and only its own possessor and progenitor regards it with such pathos, as if it housed the axis around which the entire world revolved." Morality is centred upon species survival and moral codes (whether culture specific or pan-human) more often than not revolve around survival.

And yet, I would argue that what you describe is no absolutely human element at all, but, rather, the element of any living thing concerned with survival. I do not deny that the judgements I make are coloured by my own mortality, and yet neither do I consider them moral judgements, for I am able to recognise that no matter my judgement, that judgement is not absolute, but centres around purposiveness rather than absolute truth.

I agree that fact does not imply conclusion (like an act or a text they are interpretable according to thought system), and that it is up to the individual to interpret fact, however, this does not bring me to agree with Kierkegaard.

I'd like to delve further into how this relates to my example in my previous post. To do so I'd like to go back to this statement of yours, atomiczombie: "What I am getting at is that making evaluations about whether or not something is say, "discrimination" or not, is implying that discrimination is wrong, or at the very least that some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness."

I've already touched upon why I don't believe that evaluating something as discrimination is implying wrongness, but I'd like to get to the second part that states that "at the very least some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness."

It is not that I believe passing moral judgements on others is hypocrisy, but, rather, that I believe waging a war of moral judgements is not particularly practical when you can use concrete evidence and logical conclusion, since science provides a good foundation for debating against those who would claim homosexuality "unnatural." Both sides turn into emotional maelstroms ranting and raving about what is undeniably" "right" and "wrong," and both begin to take on the stench of fanaticism rather than logic. I dislike discrimination because it denies me the freedom to be, to speak, to act, and requires that I adhere to notions that I do not agree with. This has little to do with a personal moral code, and more to do with my preference toward the freedom to analyse, to question and to be something that may defy current convention. If we focused on the science we would note that homosexuality and bisexuality are far from "unnatural," and if either were some form of “unnatural evil” then Phelps would surely need to rename his website to "god hates bonobos" or "god hates homo sapiens sapiens." Fueling the fire by waging our own moral crusade really does not do much good in overcoming discrimination. In an age where scientific understanding demonstrates more and more that fact is without bias, I am perfectly content to simply be, rather than to be good or evil or even a combination of both.

And as far as you example of the woman in the car hitting the child, what if no one were there to see her, or if no one knew of her act except for her and she thought nothing ill of it? Morality requires that something or someone judge an act, it must have a source. Without a human source of judgment it would require some other source. And that is the question I ask to both of you: what is the source of morality, if not human?

[atomiczombie]

Ok, just a heads up, I wrote up this post last weekend and was going to reread it and post it, but since I've been at work practically 24/7 the last week I didn't get a chance to do either. This is in response to Emmy and atomiczombie, for the rest who quoted me, some of your responses are addressed in some way in the post since they are similar to what Emmy and atmiczombie addressed, but I will post again later to try and clarify as far as those responses are concerned. Excuse the typos if any and rushed nature of the post, I didn't get a chance to reread. Here it be:

Thanks for your response Emmy.

In your first paragraph you write that “if the aim here is to show that an act can be right or wrong only insofar as people judge it to be, I don’t think the case has been made.” I’m curious about the reasoning behind your objection to the idea that morality (or the “right” or “wrong” nature of a given act) is entirely dependant upon the existence of man-made belief systems. What evidence is there to suggest that these acts inherently contain any moral substance when examined outside their respective systems? Belief systems are very much like a codex for the interpretation of information. Without the system or the aligning discourse they are stripped of moral meaning. For example, the end of human life on earth is one that is looked upon as negative, wrong, evil, bad, generally an unfortunate turn of events and yet take away the human desire to survive in that judgement and said apocalypse is neither positive nor negative; it simply is. The same goes for any act or event. What lends an act or an event its rightness or wrongness (particularly if one does not hold any religious belief, or any belief whatever in a sentient higher power)? What inherently grants an act moral meaning?



I do agree that one must remember that a particular moral code is a cultural product, however, I do not agree that there exists any inherently correct moral judgement. What causes one to be a more correct moral judgement than the other? Again, one requires that the judgement be made according to a particular system, otherwise it can be easily interpreted in a myriad of ways. The crux of my argument is: what determines the moral nature of a given act, if not man-made systems?

Both you and atomiczombie asked similar questions about my discrimination example and so I'm going to answer you both of you, particularly regarding what you both thought appeared to be a contradiction in my argument. Before I began I would like to say that my argument involves inherent morality, meaning a moral code that exists beyond the human mind and that is, thusly, universal.






I would like to clarify that nowhere in my post did I state that discrimination was inherently wrong. To evaluate something as discrimination is not a proclamation of its inherent wrongness. It is not an implication of wrongness until connotation is applied (which typically implies adherence to a specific system of thought) to meaning. Context, here, again implies system of thought. For example, within certain discourses the discrimination of individuals according to specific racial or sexual characteristics is not given a negative connotation, while in others it is. Discrimination itself is only positive or negative according to discourse, but is inherently neither.

Atomiczombie, you mentioned you were a philosophy student. You must certainly be familiar with Derrida and his Dissemination, then. Just as one may read a text according to a certain system (for example, what one would take from Milton's Paradise Lost using a Marxist lense differs from what one would take using Heidegger or Freud as a decoder), so can one read an act according to a certain system. Derrida wrote that when one reads a text, one both reads and creates, and that is arguably also the case with an act. One witnesses an act either directly or indirectly, and as this is done the act is also analysed and interpreted.

To clarify my meaning further: I do not need to believe that discrimination is inherently wrong in order to disagree with it or even to fight against it. I am both able to recognise that discrimination is not inherently wrong, as well as that it is not advantageous to my personal survival, yet, simultaneously, I recognise that what is disadvantageous to me or to the majority of human beings is not equatable with inherent wrongness since that would require a sort of universal archetype for right and wrong (similar to Aquinas's discussion of the goodness of god in relation to human and natural goodness discussed in his Summa Theologica, or similar to Plato's cave allegory). If morality is not man-made then it must come from some source, but if moral questions require a so-called human element then they are not absolute nor universal. As Nietzsche wrote in On Truth and Lies In A Non-moral Sense: "In some remote corner of the universe, flickering in the light of the countless solar systems into which it had been poured, there was once a planet on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and most mendacious minute in the 'history of the world'; but a minute was all it was. After nature had drawn just a few more breaths the planet froze and the clever animals had to die. Someone could invent a fable like this and yet they would still not have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, how insubstantial and transitory, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature; there were eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further mission that might extend beyond the bounds of human life. Rather, the intellect is human, and only its own possessor and progenitor regards it with such pathos, as if it housed the axis around which the entire world revolved." Morality is centred upon species survival and moral codes (whether culture specific or pan-human) more often than not revolve around survival.

And yet, I would argue that what you describe is no absolutely human element at all, but, rather, the element of any living thing concerned with survival. I do not deny that the judgements I make are coloured by my own mortality, and yet neither do I consider them moral judgements, for I am able to recognise that no matter my judgement, that judgement is not absolute, but centres around purposiveness rather than absolute truth.

I agree that fact does not imply conclusion (like an act or a text they are interpretable according to thought system), and that it is up to the individual to interpret fact, however, this does not bring me to agree with Kierkegaard.

I'd like to delve further into how this relates to my example in my previous post. To do so I'd like to go back to this statement of yours, atomiczombie: "What I am getting at is that making evaluations about whether or not something is say, "discrimination" or not, is implying that discrimination is wrong, or at the very least that some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness."

I've already touched upon why I don't believe that evaluating something as discrimination is implying wrongness, but I'd like to get to the second part that states that "at the very least some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness."

It is not that I believe passing moral judgements on others is hypocrisy, but, rather, that I believe waging a war of moral judgements is not particularly practical when you can use concrete evidence and logical conclusion, since science provides a good foundation for debating against those who would claim homosexuality "unnatural." Both sides turn into emotional maelstroms ranting and raving about what is undeniably" "right" and "wrong," and both begin to take on the stench of fanaticism rather than logic. I dislike discrimination because it denies me the freedom to be, to speak, to act, and requires that I adhere to notions that I do not agree with. This has little to do with a personal moral code, and more to do with my preference toward the freedom to analyse, to question and to be something that may defy current convention. If we focused on the science we would note that homosexuality and bisexuality are far from "unnatural," and if either were some form of “unnatural evil” then Phelps would surely need to rename his website to "god hates bonobos" or "god hates homo sapiens sapiens." Fueling the fire by waging our own moral crusade really does not do much good in overcoming discrimination. In an age where scientific understanding demonstrates more and more that fact is without bias, I am perfectly content to simply be, rather than to be good or evil or even a combination of both.

And as far as you example of the woman in the car hitting the child, what if no one were there to see her, or if no one knew of her act except for her and she thought nothing ill of it? Morality requires that something or someone judge an act, it must have a source. Without a human source of judgment it would require some other source. And that is the question I ask to both of you: what is the source of morality, if not human?

Nice. I am going to chew on this a bit before I reply. You pointed out a few things I said that I figured you would catch onto. I could have been clearer. This is a great discussion and I will have my reply for you soon. :)

[atomiczombie]

My answers are in red. Ok, just a heads up, I wrote up this post last weekend and was going to reread it and post it, but since I've been at work practically 24/7 the last week I didn't get a chance to do either. This is in response to Emmy and atomiczombie, for the rest who quoted me, some of your responses are addressed in some way in the post since they are similar to what Emmy and atmiczombie addressed, but I will post again later to try and clarify as far as those responses are concerned. Excuse the typos if any and rushed nature of the post, I didn't get a chance to reread. Here it be:

Thanks for your response Emmy.

In your first paragraph you write that “if the aim here is to show that an act can be right or wrong only insofar as people judge it to be, I don’t think the case has been made.” I’m curious about the reasoning behind your objection to the idea that morality (or the “right” or “wrong” nature of a given act) is entirely dependant upon the existence of man-made belief systems. What evidence is there to suggest that these acts inherently contain any moral substance when examined outside their respective systems? Belief systems are very much like a codex for the interpretation of information. Without the system or the aligning discourse they are stripped of moral meaning. For example, the end of human life on earth is one that is looked upon as negative, wrong, evil, bad, generally an unfortunate turn of events and yet take away the human desire to survive in that judgement and said apocalypse is neither positive nor negative; it simply is. The same goes for any act or event. What lends an act or an event its rightness or wrongness (particularly if one does not hold any religious belief, or any belief whatever in a sentient higher power)? What inherently grants an act moral meaning?



I do agree that one must remember that a particular moral code is a cultural product, however, I do not agree that there exists any inherently correct moral judgement. What causes one to be a more correct moral judgement than the other? Again, one requires that the judgement be made according to a particular system, otherwise it can be easily interpreted in a myriad of ways. The crux of my argument is: what determines the moral nature of a given act, if not man-made systems?

Both you and atomiczombie asked similar questions about my discrimination example and so I'm going to answer you both of you, particularly regarding what you both thought appeared to be a contradiction in my argument. Before I began I would like to say that my argument involves inherent morality, meaning a moral code that exists beyond the human mind and that is, thusly, universal.






I would like to clarify that nowhere in my post did I state that discrimination was inherently wrong. To evaluate something as discrimination is not a proclamation of its inherent wrongness. It is not an implication of wrongness until connotation is applied (which typically implies adherence to a specific system of thought) to meaning. Context, here, again implies system of thought. For example, within certain discourses the discrimination of individuals according to specific racial or sexual characteristics is not given a negative connotation, while in others it is. Discrimination itself is only positive or negative according to discourse, but is inherently neither.

If you are saying here that discrimination is not inherently bad then I can agree with you to the extent that you look at its primary meaning: to make distinctions based on a set of characteristics. It is the negative evaluation of those characteristics that tends to go along with making such distinctions which is its negative connotation. But I contend that the value judgments involved in discrimination are relative, which makes them unfair and therefore, morally wrong. What I mean by "relative' here, is arbitrary.

Atomiczombie, you mentioned you were a philosophy student. You must certainly be familiar with Derrida and his Dissemination, then. Just as one may read a text according to a certain system (for example, what one would take from Milton's Paradise Lost using a Marxist lense differs from what one would take using Heidegger or Freud as a decoder), so can one read an act according to a certain system. Derrida wrote that when one reads a text, one both reads and creates, and that is arguably also the case with an act. One witnesses an act either directly or indirectly, and as this is done the act is also analysed and interpreted.

To clarify my meaning further: I do not need to believe that discrimination is inherently wrong in order to disagree with it or even to fight against it. I am both able to recognise that discrimination is not inherently wrong, as well as that it is not advantageous to my personal survival, yet, simultaneously, I recognise that what is disadvantageous to me or to the majority of human beings is not equatable with inherent wrongness since that would require a sort of universal archetype for right and wrong (similar to Aquinas's discussion of the goodness of god in relation to human and natural goodness discussed in his Summa Theologica, or similar to Plato's cave allegory). If morality is not man-made then it must come from some source, but if moral questions require a so-called human element then they are not absolute nor universal.

The assertion that I am making is that making moral judgments is part of human nature, and that those judgments are not totally dependent on culture or religion, but are often fleshed out within the context of culture or religion. That they are often fleshed out that way does not mean that moral discourse cannot be applied in a universal way. A Buddhist and a Christian and an atheist can all agree that the murder of innocent people is wrong, morally, and be talking about the same thing. It can make sense for them all to discuss these kinds of issues together. There is nothing absurd about that.

As Nietzsche wrote in On Truth and Lies In A Non-moral Sense: "In some remote corner of the universe, flickering in the light of the countless solar systems into which it had been poured, there was once a planet on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and most mendacious minute in the 'history of the world'; but a minute was all it was. After nature had drawn just a few more breaths the planet froze and the clever animals had to die. Someone could invent a fable like this and yet they would still not have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, how insubstantial and transitory, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature; there were eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further mission that might extend beyond the bounds of human life. Rather, the intellect is human, and only its own possessor and progenitor regards it with such pathos, as if it housed the axis around which the entire world revolved." Morality is centred upon species survival and moral codes (whether culture specific or pan-human) more often than not revolve around survival.

I am not sure how this quote from Nietzche draws you to the conclusion that morality is only about the survival of the species. What I do know of Nietzche is that he considered morality to be a hinderance to his concept of the "will to power." He has said that the "overman", the ideal man, cannot actualize his potentiality unless he unbinds himself of the shackles of morality. He did not say that all people should unbind themselves of these shackles, however, but that only special individuals should, in order to gain power over others and maximize that power and control. It is not surprising to me that Hitler was a fan of Nietzche.


And yet, I would argue that what you describe is no absolutely human element at all, but, rather, the element of any living thing concerned with survival.

By this do you mean that making moral judgments is not only restricted to humans?!


I do not deny that the judgements I make are coloured by my own mortality, and yet neither do I consider them moral judgements, for I am able to recognise that no matter my judgement, that judgement is not absolute, but centres around purposiveness rather than absolute truth.

I am curious what you mean when you say your judgments are colored by your morality, and yet you contend they are not moral. How can you have a morality and not have moral values and make moral decisions? As far as purposiveness goes, do you mean that moral judgments have the form, if you want X, then you should do Y? If that is the case, then I would say that is not what morality is. Kant would call this a Hypothetical Imperative and not a Moral Imperative. A moral question would be, I want X but is doing Y to get it, morally right or good? Morality is a basis in itself, distinct from the question of how I achieve something.

I agree that fact does not imply conclusion (like an act or a text they are interpretable according to thought system), and that it is up to the individual to interpret fact, however, this does not bring me to agree with Kierkegaard.

I'd like to delve further into how this relates to my example in my previous post. To do so I'd like to go back to this statement of yours, atomiczombie: "What I am getting at is that making evaluations about whether or not something is say, "discrimination" or not, is implying that discrimination is wrong, or at the very least that some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness."

I've already touched upon why I don't believe that evaluating something as discrimination is implying wrongness, but I'd like to get to the second part that states that "at the very least some people who pass moral judgments on others is hypocrisy, which is a judgment in itself and also implies wrongness."

It is not that I believe passing moral judgements on others is hypocrisy, but, rather, that I believe waging a war of moral judgements is not particularly practical [practical on what basis?] when you can use concrete evidence and logical conclusion, since science provides a good foundation for debating against those who would claim homosexuality "unnatural." This debate about what is "natural" or not is separate from the argument about whether something that is natural, or unnatural is good or bad. Both sides turn into emotional maelstroms ranting and raving about what is undeniably" "right" and "wrong," and both begin to take on the stench of fanaticism rather than logic. I dislike discrimination because it denies me the freedom to be, to speak, to act, and requires that I adhere to notions that I do not agree with. This has little to do with a personal moral code, and more to do with my preference toward the freedom to analyse, to question and to be something that may defy current convention.

I can certainly understand and agree with your preference for freedom. Is freedom just a preference, really, or rather a value? Are other people's discriminatory acts which impede your freedom, wrong, or is it just that you don't like it? Do they have a right to interfere with your freedom? If they don't, then are you not making a moral judgment? Do you believe that other people should also be free? I imagine you might say something about the inherent inner drive of humanity for survival. Would you say that everyone having pure freedom is incompatible with survival or does it promote survival? Or does there not have to be some other basis for deciding how freedom is distributed and expressed? Is freedom a right? If so, when we say that, are we not making a moral judgment that is not purely relative? One could ask the same thing about survival? Is it not sometimes morally right to sacrifice your life for the sake of others? Or is it your contention that the survival of the species as a whole is an end, and not of individuals?

If we focused on the science we would note that homosexuality and bisexuality are far from "unnatural," and if either were some form of “unnatural evil” then Phelps would surely need to rename his website to "god hates bonobos" or "god hates homo sapiens sapiens."

And here, it seems you are sneaking in some sort of moral attachment to the concepts of natural and unnatural. Fred Phelps certainly does this. A purely scientific analysis can say something is natural or unnatural, but it is something further to conclude that what is natural is good, and what is unnatural is evil. That something further is the assignment of moral value to these concepts.

Fueling the fire by waging our own moral crusade really does not do much good in overcoming discrimination. In an age where scientific understanding demonstrates more and more that fact is without bias, I am perfectly content to simply be, rather than to be good or evil or even a combination of both.

And as far as you example of the woman in the car hitting the child, what if no one were there to see her, or if no one knew of her act except for her and she thought nothing ill of it? I never said or assumed in my example that anyone saw it, or what she herself thinks of it. Morality requires that something or someone judge an act, it must have a source. Without a human source of judgment it would require some other source. And that is the question I ask to both of you: what is the source of morality, if not human?

I do not disagree with you that the source of morality is human. It is part of our humanness. Human beings are beings that make moral judgments. Judgment lies in human reason, but not factual reasoning. It is moral reasoning. As to your assertion that morality requires that someone observe the acts in question for something to be moral or not, I heartily disagree. The whole, if-a-tree-falls-in-the-forest-does-it-make-a-sound-if-no-one-is-there-to-hear-it? argument is really misapplied here. There is nothing inherent in the way we use moral concepts that always assumes an observer. You can say something would be wrong if anyone did it. That is an appropriate use of moral language. Would you really believe, Ender, that if a man abducts a small child, rapes, tortures and kills that child, and no one ever sees this, learns of this, or finds the body, that the act in itself is neither moral nor immoral? I really enjoy our dialogue, and look forward to your responses. :)