"This is my truth"

[JustJo]

Originally Posted by tapu

So "my truth" means, more or less, "my experience"? I think your explanation of the meaning is excellent, Jo. Now, since there has to be a way to express that otherwise, I'm trying to think what it is so we can arrive at the beginnings of a definition.

Originally Posted by tapu

still thinking: Does "in my case" capture it (though with less eloquence)? As, "In my case, a relationship has to include sexual intimacy."?

Right....I could say "in my experience" or "in my case" and those would both work. I use those as well. I think I tend to use "my truth" when it's a stronger, more fundamental, more visceral usage.

So......in my case I prefer my coffee black. My experience is that "surprises" generally don't turn out well for me, so I prefer to know what's coming next. But my truth is that I must have a passionate connection with my partner.

It's a good, better, best kind of usage....if that makes sense...

Originally Posted by dreadgeek

That use of 'my truth' is, more or less, unproblematic since it really does not effect the world the rest of us live in. If that were the *only* way that people use that phrase, I wouldn't be concerned (and probably wouldn't be involved in this conversation). My concern is that people don't draw a distinction (presumably because they do not see one) between the following kinds of statements:

1) If there is not some kind of intellectual meeting-of-the-minds I am not going to be happy in a relationship.

2) If we allow marriages between two men or two women, we will have to allow marriages between father and daughter or a 50 year old man and an 10 year old girl etc.

The problem isn't statements of type-1, the problem is statements of type-2. I think we should not evaluate the 'my truth' idea on the basis of type-1 statements but on the basis of type-2 statements.

Cheers
Aj

Right. I think the problematic part is that many of us who use this phrase use it in different ways.

[tapu]

Originally Posted by JustJo

Right....I could say "in my experience" or "in my case" and those would both work. I use those as well. I think I tend to use "my truth" when it's a stronger, more fundamental, more visceral usage.

So......in my case I prefer my coffee black. My experience is that "surprises" generally don't turn out well for me, so I prefer to know what's coming next. But my truth is that I must have a passionate connection with my partner.

It's a good, better, best kind of usage....if that makes sense...



Right. I think the problematic part is that many of us who use this phrase use it in different ways.

Yes, I think you've captured the gradation.

[tapu]

I'm starting to see that "This is my truth" plays a useful role in language today.

Of course, this is the source of much language change. There's a need to express an idea and out of that comes a new expression.

[dreadgeek]

Originally Posted by JustJo

Right. I think the problematic part is that many of us who use this phrase use it in different ways.

Yes, precisely. I would feel better about the whole thing if people would designate or define what truths they are talking about when they speak of 'my truth'.

Cheers
Aj

[tapu]

Quote:
Originally Posted by JustJo View Post

Right. I think the problematic part is that many of us who use this phrase use it in different ways.
Yes, precisely. I would feel better about the whole thing if people would designate or define what truths they are talking about when they speak of 'my truth'.

Aj
------------------

Well, yes. But I see that as a side issue in the more formal discussion. I haven't seen anyone argue against the meaning captured by Jo's explication, from the beginning of the thread 'til now; only against the alternatives.

[AtLast]

Originally Posted by tapu

Quote:
Originally Posted by JustJo View Post

Right. I think the problematic part is that many of us who use this phrase use it in different ways.
Yes, precisely. I would feel better about the whole thing if people would designate or define what truths they are talking about when they speak of 'my truth'.

Aj
------------------

Well, yes. But I see that as a side issue in the more formal discussion. I haven't seen anyone argue against the meaning captured by Jo's explication, from the beginning of the thread 'til now; only against the alternatives.

For me, a problem arises if I sense that using this phrase means they are not willing to take a look at what is "true" for other people- or that we all see the world through filters/lenses that speak to our life experience.

This entire discussion has led me to the realization that when the word "true" or "truth" enters into things, we may be digging in our heels about something. Of course I have and do this sometimes. Yet, just considering what others are bringing to the discussion does make me more mindful of using these terms or the phrase.

I admit that I am just not at my best communication mode when I begin to feel stubborn. This usually means I am not listening to someone else.

[dreadgeek]

Originally Posted by AtLastHome

For me, a problem arises if I sense that using this phrase means they are not willing to take a look at what is "true" for other people- or that we all see the world through filters/lenses that speak to our life experience.

This entire discussion has led me to the realization that when the word "true" or "truth" enters into things, we may be digging in our heels about something. Of course I have and do this sometimes. Yet, just considering what others are bringing to the discussion does make me more mindful of using these terms or the phrase.

I admit that I am just not at my best communication mode when I begin to feel stubborn. This usually means I am not listening to someone else.

See, I think that the problem with using this construction of things being 'true' for people is that we aren't being clear about the subject matter domain. I think that, for instance, there can be multiple truths (within reason) about what makes a successful relationship. Even here I would have to draw a line. If a neighbor tells me that it is 'true for them' that beating their spouse makes their relationship healthier I'm not going to 'respect' that 'truth' and avoid calling the cops. If one is talking about your own interior landscape then sure, we all have our own truths but this observation still--even after a couple of days of sitting on it like a hen--strikes me as trivial to the point of banality and if that is what we are talking about I'm *still* confused why anyone would find that at all controversial.

My concern is not when people are talking about their own interior landscape but when they are talking about the world we all share. That is the more interesting (read problematic) use of the phrase.

Part of my problem in understanding what we are talking about, at this juncture, is that my use of the word 'true' is perhaps more constrained. For me, something is 'true' if the statement accurately describes the world in such a way the world is obliged to actually conform to that description. A couple of examples will, I hope, suffice.

1) Earth rotates on its axis every 24.25 hours and is tilted at 23 degrees relative to the plane of orbit.

2) Barack Obama is the 44th President of the United States. George W Bush was the 43rd President of the United States. William Clinton was the 42nd President of the United States.

3) Ordinary (light) water is dihydrogen monoxide, meaning that it has two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom.

4) Hydrogen has one electron and one proton.

5) All life on Earth is descended from a common ancestor and has diverged in the last 4 billion years by a process of mutation and natural selection.

You get the idea. My concern is not when people make comments about their interior landscape but when they argue that they get to have their own 'truth' relative to any of the class of ideas above. If we're *only* talking about interior landscapes then I return to my question of Monday--what about saying "my truth is..." interests people? If we're talking about the larger, more generic question of epistemology then I have to ask if the idea of each of us having our own 'truths' can even hold itself up under its own weight. It seems to me to be demonstrably false even by its own lights.

I say that because, for instance, if we each have our own truths and we need to treat those truths as valid then *my* own truth is that we *don't* have our own truths.

Cheers
Aj

[tapu]

Philosophical arguments so often wend their way down to a paradox.

[Corkey]

I think with sciences not being taught in schools we are going to experience more of this. I'm even more concerned with the kids being home schooled.
My internal truths are different from everyone else's, however the earth is not flat, the sun does not revolve around the earth and we did not just appear in this form 6,000 years ago. Science is not a god, but it can reveal many truths that mankind needs to see and hear. I think mans ego get in the way of real scientific truth.

[dreadgeek]

Originally Posted by tapu

Philosophical arguments so often wend their way down to a paradox.

"It is always a good idea to ask how some very general view about truth, knowledge, or meaning applies to itself; and few things could be more damaging to a view than to discover that it is false by its own lights. (Paul Boghossian)

The type of relativism that concerns me (which may not be the type of relativism being discussed here although I'm not sure that it isn't) falls apart under its own weight which is what I was hinting at with my statement that if we all have our own 'truths' then my 'truth' is that we don't have our own truths.

Cheers
Aj

[dreadgeek]

Normally I don't quote articles or op-ed pieces in their totality, but in this case I thought it might be useful to put forth this entire piece in yesterday's



Relativism about morality has come to play an increasingly important role in contemporary culture. To many thoughtful people, and especially to those who are unwilling to derive their morality from a religion, it appears unavoidable. Where would absolute facts about right and wrong come from, they reason, if there is no supreme being to decree them? We should reject moral absolutes, even as we keep our moral convictions, allowing that there can be right and wrong relative to this or that moral code, but no right and wrong per se. (See, for example, Stanley Fish’s 2001 op-ed, “Condemnation Without Absolutes.”)[1]

Is it plausible to respond to the rejection of absolute moral facts with a relativistic view of morality? Why should our response not be a more extreme, nihilistic one, according to which we stop using normative terms like “right” and “wrong” altogether, be it in their absolutist or relativist guises?

Relativism is not always a coherent way of responding to the rejection of a certain class of facts. When we decided that there were no such things as witches, we didn’t become relativists about witches. Rather, we just gave up witch talk altogether, except by way of characterizing the attitudes of people (such as those in Salem) who mistakenly believed that the world contained witches, or by way of characterizing what it is that children find it fun to pretend to be on Halloween. We became what we may call “eliminativists” about witches.

On the other hand, when Einstein taught us, in his Special Theory of Relativity, that there was no such thing as the absolute simultaneity of two events, the recommended outcome was that we become relativists about simultaneity, allowing that there is such a thing as “simultaneity relative to a (spatio-temporal) frame of reference,” but not simultaneity as such.

What’s the difference between the witch case and the simultaneity case? Why did the latter rejection lead to relativism, but the former to eliminativism?

In the simultaneity case, Einstein showed that while the world does not contain simultaneity as such, it does contain its relativistic cousin — simultaneity relative to a frame of reference — a property that plays something like the same sort of role as classical simultaneity did in our theory of the world.

By contrast, in the witch case, once we give up on witches, there is no relativistic cousin that plays anything like the role that witches were supposed to play. The property, that two events may have, of “being simultaneous relative to frame of reference F” is recognizably a kind of simultaneity. But the property of “being a witch according to a belief system T” is not a kind of witch, but a kind of content (the content of belief system T): it’s a way of characterizing what belief system T says, not a way of characterizing the world.

Now, the question is whether the moral case is more like that of simultaneity or more like that of witches? When we reject absolute moral facts is moral relativism the correct outcome or is it moral eliminativism (nihilism)?

The answer, as we have seen, depends on whether there are relativistic cousins of “right” and “wrong” that can play something like the same role that absolute “right” and “wrong” play.

It is hard to see what those could be.

What’s essential to “right” and “wrong” is that they are normative terms, terms that are used to say how things ought to be, in contrast with how things actually are. But what relativistic cousin of “right” and “wrong” could play anything like such a normative role?

Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed. The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”

The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever. It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus. We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.

So, it looks as though the moral case is more like the witch case than the simultaneity case: there are no relativistic cousins of “right” and “wrong.” Denial of moral absolutism leads not to relativism, but to nihilism.[2]

There is no half-way house called “moral relativism,” in which we continue to use normative vocabulary with the stipulation that it is to be understood as relativized to particular moral codes. If there are no absolute facts about morality, “right” and “wrong” would have to join “witch” in the dustbin of failed concepts.

The argument is significant because it shows that we should not rush to give up on absolute moral facts, mysterious as they can sometimes seem, for the world might seem even more mysterious without any normative vocabulary whatsoever.

One might be suspicious of my argument against moral relativism. Aren’t we familiar with some normative domains — such as that of etiquette — about which we are all relativists? Surely, no one in their right minds would think that there is some absolute fact of the matter about whether we ought to slurp our noodles while eating.

If we are dining at Buckingham Palace, we ought not to slurp, since our hosts would consider it offensive, and we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts. On the other hand, if we are dining in Xian, China, we ought to slurp, since in Xian slurping is considered to be a sign that we are enjoying our meal, and our hosts would consider it offensive if we didn’t slurp, and we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts.

But if relativism is coherent in the case of etiquette why couldn’t we claim that morality is relative in the same way?

The reason is that our relativism about etiquette does not actually dispense with all absolute moral facts. Rather, we are relativists about etiquette in the sense that, with respect to a restricted range of issues (such as table manners and greetings), we take the correct absolute norm to be “we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts.”

This norm is absolute and applies to everyone and at all times. Its relativistic flavor comes from the fact that, with respect to that limited range of behaviors (table manners and greetings, but not, say, the abuse of children for fun), it advocates varying one’s behavior with local convention.

In other words, the relativism of etiquette depends on the existence of absolute moral norms. Since etiquette does not dispense with absolute moral facts, one cannot hope to use it as a model for moral relativism.

Suppose we take this point on board, though, and admit that there have to be some absolute moral facts. Why couldn’t they all be like the facts involved in etiquette? Why couldn’t they all say that, with respect to any morally relevant question, what we ought to do depends on what the local conventions are?

The trouble with this approach is that once we have admitted that there are some absolute moral facts, it is hard to see why we shouldn’t think that there are many — as many as common sense and ordinary reasoning appear to warrant. Having given up on the purity of a thoroughgoing anti-absolutism, we would now be in the business of trying to figure out what absolute moral facts there are. To do that, we would need to employ our usual mix of argument, intuition and experience. And what argument, intuition and experience tell us is that whether we should slurp our noodles depends on what the local conventions are, but whether we should abuse children for fun does not.

A would-be relativist about morality needs to decide whether his view grants the existence of some absolute moral facts, or whether it is to be a pure relativism, free of any commitment to absolutes. The latter position, I have argued, is mere nihilism; whereas the former leads us straight out of relativism and back into the quest for the moral absolutes.

None of this is to deny that there are hard cases, where it is not easy to see what the correct answer to a moral question is. It is merely to emphasize that there appears to be no good alternative to thinking that, when we are in a muddle about what the answer to a hard moral question is, we are in a muddle about what the absolutely correct answer is.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com...pagewanted=all

Cheers
Aj